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Progress and Cumulation in the Human 
Sciences After the Fall 
Mayer N. Zald 1 
What do we mean by progress and cumulation in the social and human 
sciences? Recent thinking in the philosophy and history of  science has led to 
an abandonment of  some versions of  logical positivism and of  verificationism 
that had a strong deductive and theory testing orientation. What is to replace 
them is less clean This paper argues that progress and cumulation can be seen 
as a process of  evaluation and retention within an epistemic community. 
Scholarly disciplines differ in their social structure and in their epistemic and 
normative commitments. Since sociology is a fragmented discipline, progress 
and cumulation differ within its multiple subdisciplines, which to varying 
extents represent epistemic communities. Brief sketches of  progress (advance) 
and cumulation in several subdisciplines are offered. 
KEY WORDS: progress and cumulation in social and human sciences; philosophy of science; 
history of science; logical positivism; deduction; theory testing. 
INTRODUCTION 
The sciences rest their claims to superiority over other methods of 
revealing truth (e.g., philosophy, theology, literature,) on two related 
bases--superior methods for accepting or rejecting truth claims (e.g., con- 
trolled observation, experimentation) and methods for cumulating and or- 
ganizing truth claims (e.g., classification systems, theories, propositional 
inventories). The sciences are (were) thought to be progressive, systemati- 
cally eliminating error or falsehood and cumulating knowledge. For much 
of this century, the social sciences, especially in the United States, at- 
tempted to emulate the physical and natural sciences. Positivistic methods 
in the social sciences were thought to be superior to interpretivistic, phe- 
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nomenological, and text analytic approaches to arriving at the t ru th)  Even 
when a discipline eschewed the generalizing (nomothetic) aims of theoreti- 
cally driven science, practitioners thought they could progress by adhering 
to rigorous modes of data collection and data analysis. 
While many physical scientists continue to believe in the positivistic 
view of progress and cumulation, with its attendant materialist and mecha- 
nistic ontologies and its epistemic coordination of theories, measurement, 
and observation, historians and philosophers of science have increasingly 
challenged that vision. The fall from foundationalism not only challenges 
the epistemological grounds of science, it also has implications for concep- 
tions of progress and cumulation. On the one hand, post-Kuhn, few believe 
that theories are largely supplanted through critical tests, or through the 
formulation of more general encompassing frameworks. The language of 
paradigm succession or shift seemed much more ambiguous and open to 
social and cultural processes than the language of positivism and verifica- 
tionism suggested. Although Kulm (1977) has continued to believe in the 
progressive character of science, what progress means has become ambigu- 
ous. Science is a more disorderly and disunified enterprise than some phi- 
losophies of science had suggested. 
Post Rorty, philosophers and historians of science tend to believe 
that the act of observing the world is deeply influenced by the language 
system--the linguistic categories, embedded metaphors, and rules for us- 
ing language. There is a world out there, but we only know it through a 
socially constructed language system. An epistemology that assumes a 
mapping is in some sense a logical impossibility, because as we speak 
about it, the world as we know it is already language and theory prefig- 
ured. Indeed,  even this phrasing artificially separates language/practice 
f rom its cons t i tu t ive  role in human-wor ld  e m b e d d e d n e s s  (Rouse ,  
1987). 
Not only is positivism a misleading doctrine for the natural sciences, 
but, say interpretivists, for the social and human sciences it is doubly mis- 
leading. What is to be observed and understood is a meaning system and 
its implications. Most of the "brute facts" that are subject to enumeration 
in positivistic social science gain their force because of the cultural/social 
meanings in which the subjects of social science participate (Taylor, 1971). 
Explanation in the causal sense must give way to, or be embedded in, her- 
meneutic unveiling and interpretation. 
2Positivism has come in many guises. Anthony Giddens (1978) traces its connections to 
sociology and its vicissitudes. Here I use the term to characterize an epistemological position 
that aims for universal abstracted generalizations, or laws, connected to objective observation. 
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Now, how might we think of progress and cumulation after the fall? 3 
If older verificationist and/or logical positivist models seem less useful, what 
can we substitute for them? Specifically, how might we think of progress 
and cumulation in the human and social sciences? Beginning from an an- 
tifoundationalist and antiunificationist set of assumptions (Dupre, 1993), I 
want to argue, first, that some notion of progress (advance) is a central 
ordering or control device in the community of scholars. It is a criterion 
we use in evaluating scholarly products, in judging dissertation proposals, 
in evaluating journal articles, in praising or condemning studies. It is part 
of local practice. Second, the notions of progress and cumulation are them- 
selves social and rhetorical constructs that vary among disciplines and sub- 
disciplines. Moreover,  there may well be a difference between the 
evaluation and conception of progress within a discipline or subdiscipline 
and relevant external audiences--which may include other communities of 
scholars. This disjunction may have grave implications for the reputation 
and economic status of the subdiscipline. Third, the conception of progress 
and cumulation is tied to the structure and epistemic assumptions of schol- 
arly communities; thus we must ask what are these communities' relevant 
dimensions for understanding conceptions of progress? Fourth, what are 
the implications of this discussion for progress and cumulation in sociology 
and for the human sciences as a whole? 
To foreshadow the argument, I will argue the following: (a) Progress 
and cumulation are separate or separable issues. Moreover, progress and 
cumulation are subject to rhetorics of stylization or modelling and rhetorics 
of use or practice. (b) The operative epistemic and methodological assump- 
tions or commitments of sociological subdisciplines vary enormously; these 
epistemic/methodological assumptions structure the criteria for progress in 
subdisciplines and shape the linguistic form of truth claims and the "archi- 
tectonics" of the system of truth claims. (c) In many subdisciplines in so- 
ciology there has been great progress, but, paradoxically, in some of the 
same areas where there has been great progress, there has been little cu- 
mulation. (d) Finally, because some of the human sciences are deeply con- 
nected to the political and social concerns of the day, the changing agenda 
of society reshapes the animating concerns of scholarly disciplines. Again 
paradoxically, cumulation may occur most in subdisciplines least tied to the 
intellectual currents of the day, as scholars are tied to a more limited range 
of concerns; however, great leaps of progress, in the sense of innovative 
3Obviously, Kuhn and Rorty were not alone in creating the fall from foundationalism, especially 
the sty "hzed received version of logical positivism. Moreover, as Lowell Hargens has noted in a 
personal communication, many philosophers and historians of science never bought into all of 
the strict strictures ascribed to logical positivism. Indeed, Hempel, usually seen as the opposite 
of Kuhn, influenced him and was not hostile to his efforts (see Horwich, 1993). 
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ways of looking at issues, may occur in those subdisciplines most attuned 
to the larger currents of society. 
REFLECTIONS ON PROGRESS AND CUMULATION: RHETORICS 
AND USAGES 
Reflect on everyday usage. To make progress is to advance, to move 
forward. To progress is not just movement, but forward movement. Move- 
ment backward, or energy expended to stay in place, is less often considered 
progress; it has to be argued for, justified. Progress has a temporal and/or 
spatial component. It implies some comparison with a previous state or a 
potential future state. Progress usually implies a goal, either an objective, 
however loosely defined, or a comparison of states of knowledge on some 
implicit or explicit criterion; it is measured against a stylized or idealized 
state of being, or is a comparison of two or more alternatives, including 
the current state of knowledge. 
Although it is common to think of progress, especially in science, as 
a good, progress can be tied to dark ends, witness Hogarth's The Rake's 
Progress. In scholarship a dark sense of progress, a path toward the abyss, 
is sometimes attributed to work that appears to be nihilistic and to have a 
destructive edge without promoting alternatives. Ethically, a dark side of 
progress is found in the release of destructive and uncontrollable conse- 
quences of scientific advance. 
The word "progress" can be associated with modernity and the en- 
lightenment program linking rationality and improvement. A lively debate 
in contemporary philosophy of science revolves around exactly how much 
scholars such as Kuhn actually depart from a modernist, progressive view 
of scientific achievement (Rouse, 1991). For our purposes, without privi- 
leging science over everyday and practical knowledge, and without making 
claims for science in its overall contribution to human welfare, we will start 
from an assumption that the human sciences and its practitioners are or- 
ganized around, are oriented toward, some notion of advance, better un- 
derstanding or superior truth claims. 
Progress or advance in intellectual matters implies doing things better 
along some dimension relevant to the task. Better methods, new observa- 
tions or observation methods, greater certainty, more aesthetically pleasing 
ways of representing, more satisfying interpretations of events, all qualify 
as making progress. So too does discarding falsehoods and rejecting theo- 
ries. Notions of creative destruction suggest progress by elimination, or by 
eliminating residuals, to make way for new advances in knowledge or com- 
petencies. 
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Pre Kuhn, cumulation and progress were seen as in some sense linear. 
There was little room for backsliding, for losing knowledge. Facts cumulated 
as more studies were done; theories cumulated as successive formulations 
became more general and encompassing. The truths of an early theory were 
contained within the new formulation. Post Kuhn and post Rorty matters 
are more complicated, since facts are not independent of theory laden lan- 
guage and since both depend upon often unexplicated assumptions and 
frames. When paradigms shift there may be losses of knowledge and knowl- 
edge creating potential since the older paradigms may be better for pur- 
suing certain kinds of questions than the newer paradigms, even though 
the newer paradigms are better for the problems at hand. 
Philosopher Larry Laudan (1977) avoids some of these issues by fo- 
cusing on progress as problem solution. Admitting that there may be losses 
as well, he takes progress to be the resolution of problems--in the forma- 
tion of concepts and in their linkage in explanatory and mathematical sys- 
tems, in measurement, in data collection and data analysis, as perceived 
by the working community of scholars. 
Increasingly scholars have seen progress as a process in which a com- 
munity of scholars working with a set of (often implicit) consensus practices 
comes to accept new practices and ideas. Both the history of those practices 
and ideas, and the organization of the community, play a large role in what 
is on the table at any point in time and how new ideas and solutions will 
be evaluated (Kitcher, 1993; Rouse, 1990). The state of a field is socially 
and historically constructed; what is on the table is to some large extent 
the residue or result of prior siftings, debates, and discourse. Consensus is 
not easily won. Indeed, as Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) demonstrate for the 
case of the chemiosmotic rationale in the field of photosynthetic phospho- 
rylation, even when a consensus emerges that a once renegade theory is 
in fact important and valuable, the meaning of the theory and its fit in the 
field of knowledge may still be open to debate. 
Modernist philosophies of science argued not only that science ad- 
vances, but that it leads to more encompassing and unified systems of ex- 
planation. In this way of thinking, advance leads to cumulation through the 
successive retention of superior theories and the assimilation of facts to 
those theories. Yet advance and cumulation are separable processes. Pos- 
sibly because philosophy of science had on its agenda issues of epistemology 
and the establishment of truth, it had less to say about the retention or cu- 
mulation of "truths" once they were established. Even today, discussions 
of scientific advance tend to say less about the problem of cumulation than 
about the problem of progress. Cumulation is somehow seen as automatic. 
Yet Stephen Cole (1992, 1994), a leading sociologist of science out of the 
Mertonian framework, argues that it is precisely the difference in commu- 
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nities' abilities to agree on what is the core (the retained knowledge handed 
on to the next generation as accepted practices and ideas) and to assimilate 
knowledge to the core that distinguishes "real sciences" from the protos- 
ciences. For Cole, all scientific fields have dissension at the "frontier," but 
some do not appear to be organized to adjudicate, decide, and retain im- 
portant findings, theories, and concepts. 
Just as progress might come in several guises, so too may cumulation 
occur in several forms. One form of cumulation, accumulation, registers 
observations, preferably replicable observations. In its most empiricistic 
form, cumulation is the systematic registering of facts. But, say the more 
theoretically inclined, empiricistic cumulation is a kind of random cumula- 
t ion--a growing mountain of assorted tidbits organized only around agreed 
upon categories of observation; what is needed is a mechanism for selecting 
important observations, or selecting important and precisely explained or 
predicted observations. Classification systems, theories, and related mathe- 
matical formulations become more explicit guides for organizing the reten- 
tion of knowledge and guiding future research. 
Cole (1994) argues that agreeing on the core depends upon having 
stable objects to explain; general theory and their elementary components 
in sociology are vacuous and nongeneral phenomena are too subject to 
changes (e.g., gender relations). One might also argue that the agenda of 
some parts of sociology is tied to recent political and morally charged events 
and trends in society; thus, it is not just change within the objects of concern 
that creates instability for social scientists, but changes in the focal problems 
of concern. Here the lack of cumulation is caused not by changes within 
the object of analysis, but by which objects come, and stay, on the table 
(Zald, 1991). In the natural and physical sciences, findings, facts, and gen- 
eralizations become assimilated to the background assumptions of the prob- 
lems that are on the table. However, in some parts of the social sciences, 
shifts within objects or in the topics of concern, make irrelevant those find- 
ings or generalizations from what was once the frontier. 
The distinction between core and frontier hides the possibility that 
even among disciplines that have relatively stable objects, the architectonics 
of cumulation may differ. Ernst Mayr (1982) argues that the growth of bio- 
logical thought has occurred not through the development of universal laws, 
but through the articulation of major concepts. The scaffolding of cumu- 
lation is created by the addition of new concepts that bracket fields of in- 
vestigation and explanations. While it is possible to attempt to formulate 
laws, that is not how biologists have actually proceeded. Extending Mayr's 
argument, and without prejudging whether succeeding theories, systems or 
facts are in an absolute sense truer than earlier ones, different fields or- 
ganize their truth claims about, and their representations of, their objects 
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of analysis by different modes. Musicologists, literary theorists, anthropolo- 
gists, physicists, and sociologists differently privilege classification systems, 
theories, concepts, notation systems, and so on. In some sense, all use texts 
to communicate and cumulate, but the organization of textual repre- 
sentation and the link of the texts to communities of practice will vary. 
RHETO~CS OF PROGRESS AND CUMULA~ON 
So far I have treated the issue of progress and cumulation as a kind 
of natural category or language used by a community of scholars to guide 
research decisions and to present and organize discourse. But progress and 
cumulation are also subject to abstract discussion, emulation, and styliza- 
tion, as scholars within a community reflect on and discuss their own prac- 
tices and interact with scholars from other disciplines, as well as the 
interpreters and translators of those disciplines--philosophers, historians, 
sociologists, who render the logics and practices of disciplines. Stylized 
rhetorics develop such that practitioners who do not use them are treated 
as less advanced than those who do. At an earlier time, physicists who did 
not use mathematics were seen as less competent than those who did. To- 
day, all do. Over the last century, the mathematicization of economics, 
called "physics envy" by some, has proceeded whether or not it was ap- 
propriate to the more important problems in the field (McCloskey, 1985). 
In sociology, the belief in formal deductive theorization led to a style of 
presentation that required the formal statement of axioms and hypotheses, 
even if the logic of the argument was really contained in the explanatory 
paragraphs accompanying the propositions and derived hypotheses (cf. Zet- 
terberg, 1963). The rhetorics of cumulation sometimes showed in the pub- 
lication of propositional inventories (Berelson and Steiner, 1964). 
It is probably inherent in the human condition for people who happen 
to be scholars to reflect on their own practices and to compare them with 
past practices, with the practices of others, and with abstracted models of 
practice. Yet, more self-confident and autonomous groups of scholars are 
less likely to take seriously what others are doing or saying about what 
disciplinary practice should be. They may have an internal debate about 
what progress is, but the debate will be drawn largely from an internal 
logic of practice and aspirations within a discipline or community, rather 
than organized by and contrasted with abstracted views of science and 
scholarship or other disciplines practices. This is an aspect of the internali- 
zation of disciplines (Shapere, 1984). 
Moreover, explicit concern with progress and cumulation may vary by 
disciplines and context. The collective project of legitimizing the natural 
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and physical sciences, especially in England and the United States, led them 
to contrast themselves with the humanistic disciplines on the criteria of 
progress and cumulation. In turn, the social sciences, once called moral 
sciences, attempted to nestle close to the physical and natural sciences. 
Scholars in the humanistic disciplines surely make judgments about ad- 
vances in their disciplines. New modes of annotation, classification, and in- 
terpretation are judged superior in explaining, illuminating, and gathering 
together observations about the objects of humanistic understanding. They 
may be less likely to articulate a research or theoretical frontier, because 
some are organized around interpretative topics, not "problems." That does 
not mean, however, that better interpretations--interpretations that are 
more coherent, more illuminating, more closely tied to evidence--cannot 
be judged and handed down to successive generations. 
To summarize the thrust of the argument so far, progress and cumu- 
lation are interconnected but separable concepts; progress has more to do 
with advance, and cumulation has to do with the storage, transmission, and 
recycling of advances for further research and knowledge building. Both 
concepts are "fuzzy," and forms of advance and cumulation may be mul- 
tiple. Stylized rhetorics about progress and cumulation may be borrowed 
from other disciplines and imposed on subject matters, just as techniques 
of investigation or concepts may be borrowed. Finally, since disciplines vary 
in how they organize knowledge and make advances, progress and cumu- 
lation must be understood in the context of disciplinary practices and com- 
mitments, and in the context of the texture of scholarship. 
The Texture of Scholarship and Epistemic Communities 
Anthropologist Roy D'Andrade (1985) argues that it is useful to think 
about three models of scientific disciphnes--physical science, natural sci- 
ence, and semiotic science. He argues that the physical sciences--physics, 
astronomy, and chemistry--can be well described by the covering law model 
and are most appropriately mathematicized. The natural sciences, which 
include the biological sciences and some of the social and earth sciences, 
have a different texture. They describe adaptive systems, typically compo- 
nents of systems and their interaction with other components. Functioning 
systems' mechanisms of adaptation are important elements. Semiotic sci- 
ences-cul tural  anthropology, much of social psychology, and components 
of linguistics--deal with systems of meaning. Following the psychologist 
Thomas Lauduaer, d'Andrade argues that experimental social psychology 
is often a special way of doing American ethnography. The social sciences, 
he says, often require both natural system and semiotic approaches. It is, 
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for instance, possible to describe capitalist societies as systems of intercon- 
necting parts. However, for many purposes semiotic analysis of the (chang- 
ing) meaning of the system and its components will be required. 
He does not argue that mathematicization is restricted to the physical 
sciences, only that it is less prominently featured in the others and will 
often be subsidiary to the description of components. D'Andrade uses his 
threefold categorization to argue that form of argument, the nature of gen- 
eralization and, by implication, the logic of progress and cumulation, will 
look very different from discipline to discipline. However, aside from ar- 
guing against the usefulness of a covering law formula, and distinguishing 
system like disciplines from semiotic ones, he does not spend much time 
discussing how texture of scholarship might vary by disciplines and subdis- 
ciplines. Moreover, the broad sweep of his categorization conceals large 
differences within scientific/scholarly fields. It also fails to explore the com- 
plex linkages between parts of fields (subdisciplines, or invisible colleges) 
and to subdisciplines nominally located in other disciplines. 
Texture is a global term for the ways in which discourse in a commu- 
nity is conducted. It is rhetorics in its most inclusive and nonpejorative 
sense. It refers to the mix of linguistic/symbolic representations and the 
conventions governing their use in a community. Everything from mathe- 
matical formulae, to the presentation of graphics, to footnote conventions 
are part of the texture of a community's discourse. Different textures lead 
to different modes of reporting advances and summarizing whole fields. A 
review article in history will look very different from a review article in 
physics. Textures or rhetorics are both products and creators of epistemic 
communities. 
Scholarly communities are epistemic communities. They have what 
Margaret Somers (forthcoming) calls "knowledge cultures" or what Ian 
Hacking (1984) calls "styles of reasoning." Earlier, Fleck (1935/1979) even 
used the term "thought collective" to refer to the shared communal un- 
derstandings. 
How might we describe epistemic communities? First, they are or- 
ganized around topics. Second, the scholarly community has a repository 
of more or less organized findings, and claims about findings, in its accu- 
mulated and retrievable stock of writings and oral claims about the topic. 
Third, the community has a set of methodological commitments and claims 
about how findings are to be obtained. Fourth, the community has a set 
of implicit and explicit assumptions about what the repertoire of constitut- 
ing ideas, interpretations, and explanations that can be entertained to order 
research, to choose among renderings and readings, and to focus activity. 
To talk about progress and cumulation, then, is to talk about change 
in the stock of knowledge, methods, and assumptions in particular commu- 
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nities of scholars. Since these communities may have different and deep 
methodological commitments, orientations toward data collection and 
analysis, etc., it might be possible, though beyond my scope here, to develop 
a comparative analysis of epistemic commitments. Central are a description 
of the kinds of observations and readings made on objects (natural or hu- 
man made), the forms of summarization (quantitative, graphic, visual), and 
the language structure (mathematical, statistical, propositional, universal ex- 
tension, etc.), used to interpret and order the observations. 
Any particular scholar may be part of several communities. For in- 
stance, a scholar may be a student of Marxism in American social history 
studying mining towns and working with quantitative indicators of collective 
action. Or, a rational choice Marxist working on collective action in mining 
communities. Depending on the scholar's own capacities and predilections, 
she might be more or less attuned to debates and issues in adjoining or 
overlapping fields of study (e.g., psychoanalytic studies of 19th-century 
child-rearing practices in the working classes). Donald T. Campbell (1969) 
describes this overlap, or interlink, of communities of scholars as the "fish 
scale model" of interdisciplinary overlap. One form of progress is consti- 
tuted by forming new communities. Over time, scholars may discover topics 
untreated by, and disjunctive with, the stock of problems within a commu- 
nity. The very recognition of the separateness of the problem set is a form 
of progress. 
Over time the epistemic community produces a set of problems to 
be solved. One of the differences among communities is, of course, the 
amount of agreement about when a problem is solved or what constitutes 
a solution. The problem set may be relatively stable, and indeed so called 
solutions may represent interpretations that only crowd in on earlier inter- 
pretations, forcing them to the background without in any sense vanquish- 
ing them. However, the problem set may be changing rapidly, with or 
without consensus on solution. This juxtaposition of problem stability and 
change and consensus on the meaning of change is especially important 
for thinking about cumulation and progress. Where there is rapid change 
in problems studied or solutions suggested for those problems, and little 
consensus about either the importance of the problems or the solutions 
being offered, charges of faddism, as opposed to advance, are likely to be 
made. 
Communities of scholars are not only epistemic communities. They 
participate in a social organization that rewards and punishes behavior. 
Communities of scholars are organized around communications about the 
central topic(s)--through journals, books, conferences, and scholarly socie- 
ties. They are not the same as, though they overlap with, disciplines. They 
are made up of members--those people who are "'credentialled" to speak 
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on the topic. Credentialing can be formal or informal, but the uncreden- 
tialed have a tough time getting a hearing in the community. Credentialing 
occurs through complex processes. It is especially important for the war- 
ranting of findings and perspectives that break from the established reper- 
toire. It may be that membership within the community is heavily 
dependent upon certification of methodological competence, e.g., the abil- 
ity to do fieldwork, to use archives, to use mathematics, to do laboratory 
work, and to have command of relevant rhetorical forms (e.g., footnotes 
and footnote practice, modes of argumentation, and presentation of data 
forms). Many disciplines may have multiple certification routes. Moreover, 
in an era of blurred disciplinary/community boundaries, scholars may be at 
home in and received by multiple communities. 
Communities of scholars allocate prestige and have an internal strati- 
fication system that links contributions to the community to material and 
symbolic rewards, including jobs. Communities may vary in the uniformity 
and coherence of their stratificational/allocational systems. Those high in 
the system act as gatekeepers by evaluating contributions to the community. 
They may not be the first to recognize the contribution to progress in the 
community, and over time they may be replaced, but because the gatekeep- 
ers control access to journals, jobs, awards, career movement, and accep- 
tance of dissertations, at some point progress is validated within the prestige 
system of the community. Stinchcombe (1994) argues that the fragmented 
nature of sociology leads to many errors in the evaluation of work and the 
placement of sociologists in the academy, presumably in contrast to more 
unified, coherent disciplines. 
Communities of scholars vary enormously in their density and size, 
the number of scholars at any one time working on a set of related topics, 
or indeed, on the same problem within a topic field. The number of scholars 
working on the same problem and related topics creates both a validation 
and replication ground for the "truth" or "interpretative truth" claim, and 
a user field for demonstrating the value of the claim over time. The dis- 
tinction is not sharp, of course. Nevertheless, in many fields there may be 
a debate in which scholars address their work largely to peers thinking at 
the same level of abstraction and discourse (the validation and replication 
ground) and a group who use the arguments, concepts, and findings to 
illuminate their own extensions and applications of the argument. In other 
fields, few scholars may actually work on the same problem, but may share 
a discursive field and orientation. 
In many parts of the social and human sciences, exact replication and 
similar problem focus may be rare, though a sense of participating in a 
larger common topical area or orientation may be common. For instance, 
many scholars are now concerned with the emergence, maintenance, and 
466 Zald 
force of nationalism in social structure and ideology, though few with na- 
tionalism in 18th-century Bosnia, or some other specific locale. They share 
a general discursive field and may rely on classic and contemporary texts 
that compare nationalist movements or discuss nationalism more generally. 
Finally, communities of scholars differ substantially in their "nodal- 
ity," the extent to which scholars are clustered around organizational set- 
tings, such as research institutions--astronomy labs, survey research centers, 
or schools and publication outlets of like-minded scholars. As Whitley 
(1984) shows, the institutional/organizational nodality of a community af- 
fects the acceptance of truth claims and the orientation of research, at least 
in the short run. 
This discussion of the epistemic texture and social organization of 
communities has been developed in order to get purchase on the variation 
among communities as they develop a discourse about superior and inferior 
scholarship, claims about truth, and the value of findings and their report- 
ing. Given that communities differ in their epistemic commitments and the 
stability of their problem sets, we should get purchase on how advance and 
cumulation is registered. Let us now ask, How does progress and cumula- 
tion occur in sociology? 
PROGRESS AND CUMULATION IN SOCIOLOGY, A FRAGMENTED 
FIELD 
Disciplines may contain many subdisciplines. To the extent that a com- 
munity of scholars is coterminous with a subdiscipline, as often happens, 
the analysis of disciplinary structure illuminates progress and cumulation 
in the constituitive communities. Where there are many topics and subdis- 
ciplines, where there are few specifications of connections among the topics, 
and where there are strong disagreements about methods that help create 
noncommunicating communities, the discipline resembles an "adhocracy." 
Whitley (1984), drawing on the organizational theorist Henry Mintzberg 
(1979), sees sociology as an adhocracy with little integration across subdis- 
ciplines. An "adhocracy" is an organization in which the various units have 
little to do with each other and have different views of what the enterprise 
is about, but each makes claims about its own contribution to the overall 
organization--there is at least that much awareness that the units are part 
of the larger organization and gain legitimacy, status, and resources from 
participating in it. To understand progress and cumulation in sociology, 
then, is to examine the texture of knowledge in the many communities con- 
tained in whole or in part within the discipline. 
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Sociology has been a brawling, inchoate discipline. In The Impossible 
Science, Stephen and Jonathan Turner (1990) treat the cycles and trends 
that have occurred in American sociology over its history. One cycle has 
been the oscillation between what might be called knowledge for its own 
sake and social problem and civilizational concern. A related cycle is an 
oscillation in concern with scientific methodological purity. Depending 
upon both external and internal issues, these axes of orientation may com- 
bine or contact in ~i variety of ways. For instance, methodological purity 
emphases may be combined with applied concerns, leading to an emphasis 
on evaluation research. Or, methodological purity may be combined with 
a knowledge for its own sake emphasis, leading to what C. Wright Mills 
called "abstract empiricism." 
"It-ends include a continuing growth of substantive specializations and 
methodological techniques. Although the American Sociological Associa- 
tion's membership has not grown much in absolute numbers over the last 
two decades, the number of organized sections has more than doubled-- 
there are now over 25. New specializations, represented by sections, may 
overlap considerably with older ones; nevertheless, each new section rep- 
resents some focus of attention on a redefined or new central topic and 
defines a somewhat new community. 
Turner and Turner do not draw out the implications of their analysis 
for progress and cumulation, or the perception of progress and cumulation. 
However, they tend to be pessimists: Because sociology is inchoate and 
various groups cannot (will not) agree on core problems and methods, so- 
ciology is doomed to wander in the wilderness. Progress and cumulation 
are unlikely. Although they do not explicitly discuss their epistemological 
commitments, I suspect that they tend to be foundationalists. But if one 
rejects foundationalism and accepts a community-based definition of knowl- 
edge, quite a different set of conclusions emerges. 
If sociology had an overarching paradigmatic consensus, progress 
would be examined in terms of solving and posing questions related to the 
paradigmatic agreements and assumptions. Since it lacks that consensus, 
progress, and cumulation are measured against the problems and topics 
being debated, studied, disposed of, and succeeded in particular commu- 
nities of scholars. In disciplines with strong paradigmatic consensus, intro- 
ductory texts are likely to cover similar topics, have a shared language, and 
exhibit a consensus on the core. In an adhocracy such as sociology, however, 
cumulation occurs in the subdisciplines and introductory texts will vary be- 
cause few writers will agree on the core topics, concepts, and communities 
that need to be represented. 
Moreover, in the human sciences in general, and sociology in particu- 
lar, communities vary in the extent to which their core problems are af- 
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fected by large societal events and/or broad intellectual currents. Thus, the 
subdisciplines of sociology may well vary in the extent to which their ori- 
entations and concerns are shaped by the larger moral and political milieu. 
Let me give a somewhat cursory overview of progress and cumulation 
in four communities within sociology--ethnomethodology, historical soci- 
ology, demography, and collective behavior/social movements. These four 
were chosen because they manifest a variety of epistemic commitments and 
trajectories of advance and cumulation. In the first instance, I attempt to 
represent progress and cumulation as it might be seen from within the com- 
munity. 
Ethnomethodoiogy 
Ethnomethodology has comprised a community of scholars committed 
to analyzing the core problem of how intersubjectivity is reached among 
interactants in a local setting. Whether the local setting is the negotiation 
of sexual identity, cab drivers and their dispatchers, young doctors learning 
to be gynecologists from other gynecologists and related practitioners, or 
welfare workers in a welfare bureaucracy, the task is to examine the devices 
of interrogation, the markers of agreement (indexicality), and the mecha- 
nisms for sustaining social understandings and cognitive order of microin- 
teraction and changing interactional directions. Although not opposed to 
experimental intervention, for instance presenting subjects with someone 
with a false identity, the community disavowed quantitative analysis of in- 
teraction. Close logical analysis of the implications of verbal signing has 
been the core method. Although, it has been deeply committed to close 
analysis of language and conversation, ethnomethodologists are different 
from sociolinguists, who often have had a more descriptive and processual 
orientation, and semioticians, who are concerned with substantive meaning. 
The community of ethnomethodologists overlaps several other communi- 
t i e s - i t  has boundaries (and disagreements) with phenomenologists, stu- 
dents of occupations and organizations, and socio-linguists. 
The community took large steps in the late 1960s and 1970s. Progress 
occurred when the community agreed to conceptual distinctions and state- 
ments about when interactants can be thought to have achieved intersub- 
jectivity or when intersubjectivity was defeated. Since the community 
disavowed the logic of covering law models, it neither developed general 
propositions, nor statements of variance. Progress was contained in a set 
of interlinked papers that most members of the community read and dis- 
cussed (Heritage, 1984). A review of the paradigmatic papers would reveal 
a succession of debates in which the later papers built on the earlier ones, 
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sharpening distinctions and adding new ones. A taut and tightly reasoned 
style dominated. By the mid-1980s, the core problems may have been ex- 
hausted (but see Pollner, 1991), yet the methods of close analysis of lan- 
guage turns and referentiality could be applied to a wide variety of 
problems. As attention shifted from the core problems, the community be- 
came less distinctive in its concern. In some regard it merged with sociol- 
inguistics and conversation analysis, on the one hand, and substantive 
sociological topics like political sociology, gender relations and analysis, 
medical sociology, etc., on the other (Drew and Heritage, 1992). Today re- 
cruitment to the community has slowed and fewer sociologists call them- 
selves ethnomethodologists. 
Historical Sociology 
An interest in large-scale historical change has been part of sociology 
since its inception, and scholars such as Weber were lauded for their his- 
torically based studies of societies. Yet prior to the 1950s, few in American 
sociology carried out detailed historical analyses in a sociological mode. 
Beginning in the 1950s, expanding rapidly in the 1960s and continuing since 
there has been a massive expansion and transformation of the community 
of historical sociologists (Abbott, 1994; Smith, 1991). One might argue that 
historical sociology is a field, not a community, since so many topics can 
in fact be treated with an historical, over time, orientation. After all, every 
societal institution, category, or process can be given an historical dimen- 
sion. Conceivably equal attention could be paid to such topics as the history 
of schooling, the transformation of cities, the history of administration, etc. 
Moreover, as Abbott (1994) argues, all studies of social process, no matter 
how micro, have an implicit overtime orientation, and are thus historical. 
However, the agenda of historical sociology was heavily shaped by its ties 
to and emergence from political sociology with a left-liberal slant. The core 
problems grew out of an attempt to understand the social response to in- 
dustrialization and the transformation of capitalism. T, vo interlaced topics 
dominated when the focus was on the internal developments of nations-- 
first and foremost a materialist-class based analysis of the relationships of 
types of workers and types of elites, and second, and tied to external re- 
lations, the growth and transformation of the state. Later sociologists with 
a strong interest in less developed countries reacted to contemporaneous 
economic and political trends to redefine older topics such as imperialism 
in terms of dependency and world systems theory. 
Methodologically, the community, especially the first generation, fo- 
cused on secondary data and interpretation, rarely venturing into archives. 
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Moreover, even when they used archival material, their ties to the larger 
sociological community led them to transform archival information into 
quantitative indicators of conflict or industrial structure. 
From Barrington Moore, to Tilly, Skocpol, Wallerstein, and beyond, 
enormous progress has been made. Sharp controversies about the interplay 
of class formation, state formation, state autonomy, and world system the- 
ory generated serious and detailed analyses. Reuschemeyer et aL (1992) 
represent a culmination of the tradition energized by Moore. Obviously, 
the study of revolution and societal transformation remains viable. Thus, 
one can see continuity of problems, new perspectives brought to bear on 
older problems, evidence assembled, and some sense of advance. 
Yet there have been changes in epistemic assumptions and in core 
problems. For one, the larger meta-narratives have been questioned. More- 
over, positivistic epistemic assumptions have been shaken, leading to a 
healthy debate about methods and an opening toward culture and narrative 
analysis. Second, the growth of feminist theory has transformed the prob- 
lem agenda. Historical sociology more than many areas has moved to make 
gender a central problematic. Finally, as a focus on context and local study 
emerged, and as the dominant political/macro focus of analysis receded, 
the unity of the community may have disappeared. The demise of grand 
meta-narratives and their clashes may appear to mean a decrease in intel- 
Iectual breakthroughs, while a process of accumulation on many fronts goes 
on .  
The historical sociology community is much larger than the eth- 
nomethodological one. It is deeply interconnected to a national and inter- 
national community of historians and other social scientists with interests 
in varieties of social history. However, it is still the case that historians and 
historical sociologists often view each other over a divide: With a few ex- 
ceptions, sociologists, their theories, and their findings, have only a small 
audience among more traditional historians, even while a new generation 
of historians is more closely linked to the social sciences than their pro- 
genitors. 
Demography 
Both ethnomethodology and historical sociology have ties to fields 
and approaches long considered part of the humanities. Demography sepa- 
rated earlier from natural and moral philosophy and has its roots in social 
statistics. In some ways linked to human biology and in other ways to the 
needs of the administrative state, demography is "big science" compared 
to the other communities we have considered. Its location within sociology 
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is somewhat accidental and it has sometimes made claims for autonomy 
from sociology and location elsewhere in the academy. 
Either it uses the data bases of the administrative state--national cen- 
suses, epidemiological surveys, morbidity and mortality data--or it collects 
data on large samples, in many nations. Philanthropic foundations and gov- 
ernment agencies fund these data collection efforts and, indeed, have 
played a large role in promoting and expanding the domain of demography 
around the world. Although demographic events and processes have large 
implications for many aspects of social life--from community integration 
and socialization, to the health and welfare of populations, to economic 
growth and change, to party politics--the agenda of demography is set to 
a larger extent than in most social science disciplines by the agenda of the 
state and major funding agencies. When family planning and birth control 
is perceived as a large problem, funds are committed to relevant studies. 
When societal interest switches to migration and immigration, a different 
part of the demographic equation is examined. 
The demographic community, more than any of the others discussed, 
has made a wholesale commitment to positivism, especially of an empiricist 
kind. There is a large commitment to data quality and data sets. Theoretical 
ideas are close to the ground. Although Marxist or neo-Marxist theories 
of the relationship of households to production systems play a role in demo- 
graphic thinking, demographic theories tend to have clear indicators and 
testable propositions. Although gender issues have become important in 
demography, especially the relationship of the changing status of women 
to a host of household compositional issues, feminist theory more generally 
has not. 
The commitment to precise measurement ties demography to ad- 
vances in statistics that are fairly precise and clear in their consequences 
for estimation. Advance in statistical techniques tied to computer process- 
ing capacity allows for more complex modeling of larger data sets, with a 
greater range of variables. Within the community of demographers, the rea- 
sons why earlier methods have been superceded is clear, even though de- 
bate often is quite fierce and some social statisticians argue that the 
application of more "sophisticated" tools often leads to difficult to interpret 
findings and a violation of statistical assumptions. 
In American sociology population studies were tied to ecology. Over 
the last two decades the field has changed significantly in its dominant in- 
terests and connections. For a while, roughly from the mid-1950s until the 
mid-1970s, the statistical focus upon aggregate changes in large samples 
was applied to studying the distribution of status and prestige in the strati- 
fication order. In more recent times, ecological and stratificational interests 
have declined, while social epidemiological issues have come to the fore. 
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The core may be represented by mathematical demography and stable 
population theory, which provides accounting identities around which the 
field is organized (Preston, 1993). Thus, even though topics recede from 
the agenda and others come to the fore, a sense of continuity and cumu- 
lation is achieved. More is known about birth rates, death rates, and mi- 
gration and their interpenetration with social and economic processes. 
Demographers can cite area after area where empirical findings have clari- 
fied our knowledge of such matters as the cost of divorce, or the relation- 
ship of social indicators to mortality and morbidity, or the relationship of 
birth control programs to birth rates, or to the causes and consequences 
of single-headed families. 
At the same time, the larger intellectual currents sweeping the social 
sciences and the humanities often have been marginalized. It is not that 
demographers are unaware of the importance of societal definitions for 
either their own research agenda or for the definitions of their key terms. 
Demographers know, for instance, that racial categories are social con- 
structs, that natalist and immigration policies are the result of political-so- 
cial processes. In recent times, the impact of culture on demographic 
processes has become an important topic. But these larger currents do not 
challenge the core commitments of the epistemic community. They may 
nuance the discussion, or denaturalize and deuniversalize some concepts, 
or introduce new variables for analysis, but the discourse proceeds within 
the commitments to large data sets, statistical estimation and core popu- 
lation variables. 
Collective Action/Social Movements (CA/SM) 
In contrast to demography, whose core topics were strongly linked to 
specific statistical modes of analysis, and concepts, such as cohorts, that 
had clear methodological implications, CA/SM has been driven more by 
theoretical and conceptual developments and has been quite eclectic in its 
methodological commitments. Originally, CA/SM largely organized around 
descriptive case studies, but increasingly a variety of methods have been 
employed--experimental studies of collective action in small groups, com- 
puter simulations, detailed observational studies of collective action events, 
such as protests and riots, codings and quantitative analysis of CA/SM ac- 
tivities as reported in the media, event-history analyses of the births and 
deaths of SMOs, and so on. 
The study of social movements and collective behavior was trans- 
formed by the political events of the 1960s and the intellectual currents of 
the social sciences of the 1960s, first, and then the 1970s and 1980s. The 
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political events--the rise of the civil rights movement and the student and 
anti war movements--normalized social movements. Where the Chicago 
School approach tended to lump social movements with collective behavior 
(riots, panics, fads, public opinion), the irrationalist assumptions sometimes 
assumed to undergird that clustering were challenged by those who saw 
political movements as politics by other means. 
The newer resource mobilization approaches explored the implica- 
tions of assuming that social movement and collective action activity was 
in some sense rational, responding to a sometimes implicit, sometimes ex- 
plicit, calculation of costs and benefits. One of the great achievements of 
social science, and social movement theory in particular, was to problema- 
tize "interests." Most political scientists and sociologists had assumed an 
automatic link between interest and action. Although he was not the only 
one to raise the issue, Mancur Olson's (1965) important Logic of Collective 
Action cast starkly the free rider, mobilization, and collective action di- 
lemma. The Resource Mobilization/Collective Action paradigm became the 
dominant paradigm (Morris and Herring, 1987; Zald, 1992). The Political 
Process approach was a major restatement and extension for political move- 
ments. Even though these approaches became dominant, many social move- 
ment scholars did not and do not buy into these approaches and older 
traditions retain vitality. 
By the end of the 1970s, the growth of the new social movements 
(the women's, gay rights, and environmental movements), with their focus 
on social redefinition, consciousness-raising, and identity, presented a chal- 
lenge to these earlier approaches, which assumed agreed upon social cate- 
gories and definitions of injustice. In a sense, New Social Movement 
theorists problematized interests in a different way: Where CA/SM scholars 
problematized mobilization, New Social Movement scholars problematized 
identities that lead to interests. 
Moreover, in the United States, borrowing from Goffman, analytic 
and methodological approaches to the study of frames (i.e., the way symbols 
and phrases define problems and potential solutions), cognitive constructs, 
and symbolic packages provided tools for the examination of discourse. 
Matters of ideology and culture are more prominent in this community 
today than they were 15 years ago, yet the turn to discourse and culture 
is often treated without historical and cultural depth, in part because the 
community focuses mainly on contemporaneous movements and recent bat- 
ties. Currently the "hot" end of the field is focusing on political process 
models and framing, yet the mobilization/collective action approach retains 
a fair degree of viability. 
This area reveals an almost Lakatosian process of research program 
development and change. More influenced by events in the larger society 
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than many areas in social science or sociology, and open to intellectual 
currents in the humanities as well, it is less open than historical sociology 
to these latter currents. 
Although within the community there is a great sense of advance and 
cumulation, not all who work in this area see the process so benignly. Piven 
and Cloward (1991), for instance, believe that the normalization of protest 
in social movement theory leads to an underestimation of the importance 
and value of disruptive and less organized protest. From a different slant, 
James Rule (1988, 1994) argues the choice of approaches has been more 
a function of expressive taste than logic and observation, and that the shift 
from older approaches has led to important losses of topics from the re- 
search domain. Thus, he thinks, we may only be seeing a faddish shift in 
focus. While there have been losses, such as scholars' tendency to under- 
estimate the role of hot emotions in fueling movements and collective ac- 
tion, losses occur in many fields when paradigms shift. The gains from the 
newer work have been substantial. 
These communities differ quite substantially in their ability to gener- 
ate cumulative knowledge and to progress over their recent histories. Ar- 
guably, the demographic community, because it agrees on a core set of 
population components with measurable dimensions, is well structured for 
cumulation, not around a hierarchically ordered set of theoretical propo- 
sitions, but around a set of topics with well-defined parameters. But the 
intellectual strategy tends to be incremental and is not conducive to large 
steps forward. Historical sociology, which made large progress as it blocked 
in major explanatory schemes for major social processes, may be in the 
process of splintering. As meta-narratives are brought into disrepute, strong 
unifying themes, tying researchers together, vanish. Alternately, since his- 
torical sociology inherited political sociology's emphasis on moral and po- 
litical concerns--it has attracted the left within the discipline--those same 
concerns may structure the agenda. But without unifying meta-narratives, 
progress may come more by examining new areas than by developing en- 
compassing explanations (see Lloyd, 1993, who argues for the enduring 
value of a macrostructuralist agenda). It may be that cumulation will occur 
around narrower topics. I should add, however, that the fact that historical 
sociology bridges to intellectual history and the humanities makes it more 
open than some other sociological communities to broader intellectual cur- 
rents. Ethnomethodology made enormous progress early, but has been dif- 
fused into conversation analysis and applied concerns. There is some reason 
to believe that a market for ethnomethodology, narrowly conceived, never 
developed. It is difficult to separate the political economy of the field, which 
then limits the possibilities of research, from a fading intellectual agenda. 
However, ethnomethodology was cumulative, in the sense that later work 
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was based on earlier work, but because of a narrow agenda, around sharper 
analytic distinctions. Empirical generalizations were never its goals. Finally, 
the study of social movements made large strides, but is now in a period 
of consolidation. There are large sets of problems that have not been well 
investigated; for instance, only recently has the transnational nature of col- 
lective action and social movements come onto the agenda, but the con- 
tours for major advance may be past--for now. 
Other fields or communities in sociology would reveal quite different 
patterns. Cultural sociology, for instance, has been on the upswing, with a 
heightened sense of controversy and progress. For almost two decades the 
sociology of organizations has been shaped by two or three large theoretical 
agendas, although other approaches have continued to flourish. What ap- 
pears to be clear is that progress has been rapid in some subcommunities, 
incremental in others, and barely happening in still others. What we cannot 
do is draw conclusions about progress and cumulation in the discipline as 
a whole. 
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND CUMULATION IN 
INTERPRETATIVE COMMUNITIES 
It is likely that this approach can be applied to many of the commu- 
nities that make up the social sciences. In some of them we may even be 
able to speak of progress and cumulation in a discipline, if the discipline 
has an overarching paradigm that guides subdisciplines and communities 
that comprise it. Economics is the most likely current candidate. But can 
this approach work in disciplines and communities less organized around 
research problems, more oriented to a community discussion and interpre- 
tation of shared objects of attention? Does it work in communities where 
the language of truth claims seems alien to the community? Where there 
is little attempt to disprove or validate others claims? Where in fact only 
a very few people identify a common problem, even though they share 
broad intellectual orientations and commitments to modes of argument and 
evidence? 
With some qualifications, I think the main contours of the argument 
hold. First, interpretative communities vary among themselves in their 
methodological commitments. Although most give primacy to texts, the use 
of texts varies considerably. In some the text is the basis for a conversation. 
In much of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, for instance, foot- 
notes are lightly used, argument is logical, and great attention is given to 
definitions and consequences of alternative definitions. In others, the text 
is heavily footnoted and the footnotes refer not to other scholars' interpre- 
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tations but to historical/linguistic evidentiary claims. The dialogue with 
other contemporaneous scholars is minimized. 
In many interpretative communities a clear succession of problem top- 
ics can be seen, or new topics coming on, and old topics leaving. Moreover, 
a similar transformation of communities can be seen, as the utility of older 
ways of studying subjects is found to be wanting. For instance, the philoso- 
phy of science has been radically reconfigured, opening up to the history 
and, possibly, the sociology of science in ways in which the older philosophy 
of science did not. (Some philosophers of science still operate in a pure 
analytic/epistemological mode attempting to preserve an uncontaminated 
realm.) Other areas of philosophy proceed in the same analytic mode that 
they have for decades. Similarly, it is obvious that over the last 70 years 
there have been significant shifts in literary theory, which many practitio- 
ners would evaluate in terms of progress or advance, even though outsiders 
might not validate those claims; I am sure that criteria of goodness and 
badness, of betterness, will be found in almost all communities. I am less 
clear about the question of cumulation in interpretative communities and 
leave it for further discussion. It may be that there is progress in problem 
definition, and cumulation of facts, but that changes in problem definition 
operate more to rule out interpretations than provide scaffolding for in- 
clusion and cumulation. To the extent that interpretative glosses are not 
lost, possibly we can speak of interpretative cumulation. At the very least, 
the reigning interpretative glosses set the stage for the next generation as 
they use evidence and logic in a community dialogue. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The core of my argument is that the collapse of foundationalism and 
linear models of scholarly progress has created a gap in our self-under- 
standing of what we as scholars are about. Older notions of progress and 
cumulation have to be revisited. Here progress, or advance, has been at 
least partially separated from cumulation, the processes of retention, trans- 
mittal, and recycling. Different fields of knowledge will vary in the stability 
of their problem sets, in the degree of consensus about what is an advance, 
in the recognition of and recycling of those advances by neighboring com- 
munities of scholars, even in the extent to which their fields are organized 
around problems or broader discursive topics. 
I have chosen to think of progress and cumulation in terms of com- 
munity practice, epistemic commitments, and organization. Since sociology 
is a fragmented discipline, progress and cumulation have to be seen in the 
contexts of the subdisciplines/communities that compose it. Here we have 
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sketched progress and cumulation in four communities, ethnomethodology, 
historical sociology, social movements and collective action, and demogra- 
phy. In the first instance, advance and cumulation is internally viewed and 
used, even though the importance and valuation of those advances may 
largely depend upon the judgments and valuation of external audiences, 
and the relevance of findings and interpretations to others' life-worlds. Af- 
ter all, scholarship becomes largely an avocational affair, if deans, students, 
other scholars, funding agencies, and the broader public cannot connect to 
the scholarship in some way. Still, amateur scholarship can pursue truth, 
and amateur communities can be epistemic communities. 
I do not rule out other, more holistic critiques of the very enterprise, 
which emphasize the political constitution of communities (Rouse, 1987). 
There are no transcendent truths in this approach--it is communities all 
the way down. In this paper, I have only alluded to the political economy 
of scholarly communities. The sociology of science has at least two large, 
though interconnected, agendas--one accounting for the intellectual con- 
stitution of communities, the other tying it to the flow of resources and 
rewards. In recent years, the former has received more attention. More- 
over, the sociology of the human and social sciences is much less devel- 
oped than the sociology of the natural and physical sciences. If we do 
develop the sociology of the human sciences, we have to pay attention 
to a key resource flow rarely mentioned in the sociology of science, the 
flow of students and the interplay with publishers, mass media, and audi- 
ences. Many of the human sciences are less internalized than the natural 
and physical sciences; their ideas arise from and are more easily assimi- 
lated to the larger cultural milieu. Understanding these processes repre- 
sents a real opportunity. My sense is that an exciting field remains to be 
explored. 
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